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Human behaviour in banking and financial systems is in part made up of a complex mix of 
political, social and cultural factors. These factors are reflected in expert opinion based 
political risk scores. Market inefficiency is largely a result of anomalies in human behaviour 
causing information asymmetries. A basic systemic market model is re-specified into a model 
for international banking systems, which controls for pure political risk. Samples of 
developed and developing banking systems are examined. Political risk factors and world 
banking returns are exogenous in models of country-banking system returns. New political 
information assists in explaining banking system stock returns. The findings should be of 
interest to investors in banking stocks. Banking regulators may be assisted in decisions on 
appropriate levels of regulatory capital as a benchmark for banking systems. The model could 
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Introduction 
 
Financial economists often focus solely on historical economic and financial data and ignore 
the human element. This behavioural element is difficult to measure. Risk ratings agencies,2 
canvassing the opinions of credit risk experts, have attempted to quantify political risk by 
scoring various countries according to degrees of such risks as corruption, quality of 
bureaucracy and history of law and order. In this paper these subjective factors are deemed to 
be pure political risk factors.  
Political risk in a banking context is deemed to be the risk that cash flows accruing to a 
country’s banks and bank investors will be adversely affected by changes in government 
policy that are  independent of monetary policy considerations. Political risk is country 
specific and subjectively assessed. The most appropriate investigative tools for this 
investigation derive from portfolio and capital market theories adapted to control for pure 
political risk. 
Markowitz (1959) developed a basic portfolio model for securities based on a series of broad 
assumptions relating to investor behaviour3.  He demonstrated that the variance of the returns 
was a meaningful measure of portfolio risk. Under his assumptions, a single asset or a group 
of assets in a portfolio is efficient if no other asset or group of assets provides a higher 
expected rate of return for the same or lower risk or lower risk with the same or higher rate of 
return. Capital market theory has built on the Markowitz portfolio model and requires similar 
investor behavioural assumptions with additional assumptions that include consideration of 
the risk free rate of return4.  
                                                 
2 For example, ICRG (2005) published by the Political Risk Services Group. 
 
3 For example, investors maximise one-period expected utility and their utility curves demonstrate diminishing marginal utility of wealth, 
and for a given risk level investors prefer higher to low returns and for a given level of return lower for higher risk. 
 
4 Other principal assumptions are that capital markets are in equilibrium with all investments priced accurately in line with their risk levels 
and that there is no inflation or change in interest rates or inflation is fully anticipated. Also that there are no taxes or transaction costs in 
buying or selling assets. 
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The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) developed by Sharpe (1964) and arbitrage pricing 
theory (APT) developed by Ross (1976) differ in that the latter includes several risk factors. 
This permits a more comprehensive definition of systematic investment risk than that in the 
CAPM’s single market portfolio. Fama and French (1992) found a weak association between 
the returns of an asset and its beta. They found statistically significant relationships between 
returns, firm size and the ratio of book to market values. Roll (1977) suggested that the 
market proxy for CAPM may not be mean-variance efficient.  
A criticism of the APT is that the risk factors in the model are not defined in terms of their 
quantity, but significantly, the APT asserts that a security’s return has an expected and an 
unexpected component. By implication it has a measurable or quantifiable or systematic 
component based on fact and a difficult to measure or unsystematic component that is based 
largely on opinion.  
More recently, multifactor models have attempted to turn theory into practice and use a 
variety of macro and micro economic factors to explain risk and return. Many of these 
multifactor models may not be firmly founded in capital market or economic theory and there 
are many different specifications (Reilly & Brown, 2003). Ultimately, if political, social and 
cultural factors are to be taken into account in a model of country banking system returns, it 
is necessary to incorporate them into a basic market model. This avoids the myriad of 
problems encountered in more advanced versions of the CAPM or the APT or the multifactor 
models. Reilly and Brown (2003) imply that it is feasible to apply a basic market model to a 
financial system using systemic stock price index data provided the constituents of the 
indices used are representative of the industry in the country concerned.  
In a basic market model, the unsystematic factors are largely human behavioural in nature 
and include country specific political, cultural and social influences. Economic (market) 
factors based on fact are captured in the regression intercept and beta as systematic risk. 
 3
Country specific factors are captured within the error term along with unmeasurable factors 
such as unanticipated terrorist attacks and natural disasters. A key question in this paper 
relates to the proportion of unsystematic risk that is described by pure political risk. 
Sovereign risk ratings compared to pure political risk ratings 
 
Sovereign credit rating history is published by world credit risk rating agencies such as 
Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch-IBCA. The ratings scales and assessments are 
comparable and the scales extend from extremely strong ability to repay through to default. 
The agencies also report credit watches (short-term potential direction) and ratings outlooks 
(long-term potential directions).  
According to various authors5, country risk is the inability or unwillingness of a country to 
service external debt. This implies that total country risk has an economic and a financial 
component (that is, a systematic component that is based on historical balance of payment 
data) as well as a human component (or an unsystematic or country specific component that 
is based on opinions on political outcomes that are also influenced by social and cultural 
factors). The economic and financial component is objectively assessed as it is based on fact. 
It is not avoidable as it is the same for all.  
The unsystematic component of risk is largely subjectively assessed (that is, it is political, 
social and cultural in nature) and thus is difficult to measure. However unsystematic risk is 
avoidable through diversification. Political risk is the slowing down in the meeting of 
external commitments due to political factors such as riots, strikes and civil unrest and this is 
related to other factors such as the degree of corruption in government, the history of law and 
order, the quality of the bureaucracy etc. These factors have much to do with the social 
customs and cultural history of most countries. 
 
                                                 
5 Referred to in Simpson (2002). 
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Simpson (2002) undertook a cross sectional study of 1995 country and international banking 
risk ratings and economic and financial data, and from this study several comments may be 
made about the leading country/sovereign risk ratings agencies. Firstly, the risk ratings from 
these agencies are highly positively correlated. Secondly, country risk ratings may be largely 
replicated using primarily trade performance and debt serviceability data.  Thirdly, country 
risk ratings are also highly positively correlated with international banking risk ratings, thus 
reflecting the importance of banks as key economic agents. Fourthly, pure political risk 
factors have a very small role in the ratings replication process. Finally, from a cross 
sectional analysis of risk ratings alone it is not possible to tell whether or not the ratings lead 
or lag either financial or economic crises. 
In light of the problems associated with the analysis of cross sectional country/sovereign risk 
score data, it is proposed in this study that pure political risk data be incorporated into returns 
data and isolated as a separate variable for investigation in both unlagged regression and 
lagged bivariate time series analysis. Pure political risk scores are available in time series 
through the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The basis of this risk scoring system is 
described in the section on pure political risk and in Appendix 1.  
The issues in the study are as follows: How important are pure political risk factors in 
explaining unsystematic risk in banking system returns? Are these risk factors therefore 
significant in explaining banking system returns? Do the risk score changes and world 
banking returns lead or lag stock market returns in banking systems? If world banking returns 
and pure political risk factors are exogenous, is a new re-specified international banking 
market model feasible? Can such a model be of use to banking regulators and to international 




The literature on stock market returns and country/sovereign risk 
 
Most authors have not properly differentiated between country/sovereign and pure political 
risks. That is, they have analysed country or sovereign risk ratings (which have strong 
economic and financial components) and have ignored pure political risk. Studies such as 
Holthausen and Leftwich (1986), Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich (1992), Maltosky and 
Lianto (1995) argued that sovereign risk rating downgrades were informative to equity 
markets, but upgrades did not supply markets with new information. Cantor and Packer 
(1996) examined a sample of developed and emerging markets over the period 1987 to 1994 
and found that sovereign risk ratings had a significant impact on bond yield spreads.  
Erb, Harvey and Viskanta (1996) discussed the importance of an understanding of country 
risk for investors. They found that country risk measures are correlated with future equity 
returns but financial risk measures reflect greater information. They also found that country 
risk measures are also highly correlated with country equity valuation measures and that 
country equity value oriented strategies generated higher returns.  Diamonte, Liew and 
Stevens (1996) used analyst’s estimates of country risk to show that country risk represents a 
more important determinant of stock returns in emerging rather than in developed markets. 
They also found that over the past 10 years country risk had decreased in emerging markets 
and increased in developed markets. They speculated that if that trend continued the 
differential impacts of country risks in each of those markets would narrow.  
Larrain, Reisen and von Maltzan (1997) incorporated country risk data up to the Mexican 
crisis of 1994 to 1995 and found that the overall impact of ratings changes on bond prices 
was insignificant. Hill (1998) found that in times of crisis many investors may be determined 
to minimise exposure to securities affected by country risk until they have more information, 
but after a period of calm the spreads being offered appear to be too high relative to the risks. 
After more investors return to the market the spreads get less and when there is another crisis 
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the cycle recommences. Specifically in regard to the Asian currency crisis, Radelet and Sachs 
(1998) suggested that country/sovereign risk ratings agencies were too slow to react and 
when they did react it was suggested that their ratings intensified and prolonged the crisis.  
Ferri, Liu and Stiglitz (1999) argued that the ratings agencies behaved in a procyclical 
manner by upgrading country/sovereign risk ratings during boom times and downgrading 
them during crises. Reisen and von Maltzan (1999) argued that ratings agencies exacerbated 
boom-bust cycles in financial markets and put emerging markets at greater risk.  Hooper and 
Heaney (2001) studied regionalism, political risk and capital market segmentation in 
international asset pricing. They concluded that multi index models should be tested that 
incorporate a regional index, an economic development attribute, commodity factors and a 
political risk variable in order to more effectively price securities.  
Brooks, Faff, Hillier and Hillier (2004) argued that equity market responses to 
country/sovereign risk ratings changes revealed significant responses following downgrades. 
Hooper, Hume and Kim (2004) found that ratings agencies provided stock markets and 
foreign exchange markets in the United States with new tradeable information. Ratings 
upgrades increased stock markets returns and decreased volatility significantly. They also 
discovered significant asymmetric effects of ratings announcements where the market 
responses were greater in the case of ratings downgrades.  
Few authors have examined pure political risk factors. However, Busse and Hefeker (2005) 
explored the connection between pure political risk, institutions and foreign direct investment 
flows (some of which is channelled into stock markets). They found that government 
stability, the absence of internal conflicts and ethnic tensions, basic democratic rights and the 
ensuring of law and order are highly significant determinants of foreign investment flows. 
The evidence is mixed but most evidence points to country/sovereign risk having a 
significant relationship with stock market returns. Some arguments imply that financial crises 
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refected in reduced stock market returns are the drivers of sovereign risk ratings. If this is the 
case, risk ratings agencies cannot contribute new information to financial and banking 
markets for investors and nor could they be useful to banking regulators.  
The Basel Committee is becoming more reliant on country/sovereign risk ratings agencies for 
its regulatory regimes. However, they may be ignoring pure political risk. It is put that the 
policy implications are only relevant and new information will only be added to markets if it 
can be proven that pure political risk rating changes, whether upgrades or downgrades, lead 
changes in banking stock market returns. This cannot be discovered in single period 
regression analysis. Nevertheless, regression analysis of unlagged data will at least identify a 
statistically significant relationship between variables. Analysis of lagged data in vector 
autoregressive (VAR) models will verify whether or not a new single period systemic 
international banking market model can include the specification of a subjectively based 
behavioural variable (such as pure political risk ratings).  
What is pure political risk? 
 
Economic and financial risk has nothing overtly to do with pure political risk, although it is 
arguable that under the surface, the unwillingness to service external debt may be influenced 
by acute shortages of foreign exchange (Bourke & Shanmugam, 1990). Pure political risk 
relates to political stability. Expert opinions are collected, collated and categorised by scoring 
systems (such as ICRG (2005) published by the Political Risk Services Group). The areas 
rated include government stability, socio economic conditions, investment profile, internal 
conflict, external conflict (where the ratings ascribed are out of 12), corruption, military in 
politics, religious tensions, law and order, ethnic tensions, democratic accountability (where 
the ICRG ratings are out of 6), and the quality of bureaucracy (where the IRCG rating is out 
of 4).  
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According to ICRG (2005) the higher the score or rating in each category, the lower the risk. 
The ratings by ICRG differentiate between alternating democracies6, ranging through 
denominated democracies, de facto one party state, de jure one party state, to autarchy7. In 
these ratings the lowest risk applies to alternating democracies and the highest risk applies to 
autarchies. For definitions and descriptions of pure political risk components see Appendix 1. 
The model 
 
The first step is the specification of a basic systemic international banking market model of 
unlagged returns variables. The errors of the regressions of country banking stock market 
price index returns 8 against a world banking stock market price index return are captured so 
that differentiation may be made between systematic and unsystematic risk.  
According to this model systematic risk components are assumed captured in the regression 
intercept and coefficient and idiosyncratic (unsystematic) risk components are assumed 
captured in the error term.  
ttttt iwiii




R is the return on a banking system’s price index at time t . i
ti
α  and 
ti
β are the regression coefficients representing the proportion of systematic or market 
risk in banking system i at time t . 
tw
R is the return on a world banking price index at time . w t
ti
e is the error term of the regression indicating the unsystematic risk in banking system at 
time t . 
i
                                                 
6 Characterised by free and fair elections for the legislature and executive, constitutions, more than one political party, checks and balances 
in executive, legislative and judicial functions, an independent judiciary, and constitutional protection of human liberties. 
 
7 Where leadership of the state is by a group or an individual without being subject to any franchise, either through military might or 
inherited right. 
 











For the purposes of this study an in accordance with capital market theory, the regression 
errors are then adopted as a measure of unsystematic risk in those banking markets such that 





The regression intercepts and coefficient in Equation 1 are assumed to capture all market risk 
factors such as changes in interest rates, exchange rates and the economic and financial 
components of country/sovereign risk reflected in balance of payments data. It is assumed 
that pure political risk (due entirely to political, social and cultural factors) is subjectively 
quantifiable, country specific and may be considered as part of unsystematic risk.  
Therefore, when unsystematic risk, as defined above, is regressed on political risk ratings 
associated with banking system returns, the regression coefficients indicate the contribution 
of political risk to unsystematic risk in each banking market. The residual of this regression 
indicates the remaining proportion of unsystematic risk that is probably unmeasurable, but 
attributable to such factors as natural disasters. Such factors are impossible to predict and are 
part of the residual in an unlagged unsystematic risk regression. 
ttttt iiiii




U is the unsystematic risk in banking system at time . i t
ti
P is pure political risk associated with banking system returns for banking system i  at 




φ are the regression intercept and coefficient (representing the proportion of 
unsystematic risk explained by political risk ( ) associated with the returns in banking 





r is the regression error term representing the proportion of unsystematic risk explained by 
factors other than subjectively quantifiable pure political factors in banking system at time t . i
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The next step is to specify a new basic single system international banking market model 
treating world banking returns and political risk variables as exogenous. 
tttitttt iiwiii




R is the return on a country banking system price index value at time  i .t
tw
R is the return on the world banking price index at time  .t
ti
P is pure political risk associated with banking system returns in banking system at time  i .t
α is the regression intercept and 1β  and 2β  are the regression coefficients. 
ti
u represents the error term that reflects substantially reduced unsystematic risk factors9 that 
are not measurable or that are difficult to measure. 
Based on Granger (1988) findings that financial and economic time series may contain unit 
roots and in the development of the theory of non-stationary time series analysis, the 
unlagged regression model (Equation 3) is re-specified into a lagged vector autoregressive 
(VAR) model to implement VAR based tests of cointegration and causality to test for long-
term cointegrating relationships and exogeneity. 
tttnttt iiwinii




Daily banking stock market price index data from 31/12/1999 to 17/9/2004 are extracted 
from the Datastream database and converted to returns data for developed countries 
(represented by a sample of developed economies in the USA, UK, and Australia) and a 
sample of developing economies or emerging markets (represented by Thailand, The 
Philippines and Malaysia) are compared to returns on the world-banking price index. The 
                                                 
9 Pure political risk factors now being included in the intercept and coefficients of the regression. 
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data are extracted from Datastream for the period January 1997 to January 2003. The data are 
analysed using the EViews (2001) statistical package. 
Political risk ratings have been described above by ICRG in Appendix 1. The monthly 
composite political risk scores (combining all of the risk components and subcomponents) are 
ascribed by ICRG to be out of 100 for each country. According to ICRG, the numerically 
higher the ascribed score, the lower the political risk. For the purposes of this paper and for 
ease of demonstrating the risk/return tradeoff, the scores are deducted from 100 and the 
resultant number is multiplied by 0.01 to arrive at a probability of default due to pure political 
risk. In this way a low probability of default reflects low political risk and a high probability 
of default represents high political risk.  
This is consistent with finance theory where low risk is associated with low returns and high 
risk is associated with high returns. The resultant probabilities are then multiplied by daily 
banking stock market index returns to arrive a daily country political risk value associated 
with that country’s banking returns. This is then referred to as a country banking political risk 
variable. That is, the country banking political risk variable in Equations 3 and 4 is 
represented in the following expression. ))(01.0)(100(
tt ii
RICRGScoreP −= . It is also 
consistent with finance theory in the risk/return trade off, that a low value of the country 
banking political risk variable means that a low level of pure political risk for a country is 







 The first part of the preliminary analysis tests level series and regression errors for 
stationarity, serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. Initial regression (OLS), unit root 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests 10 and serial correlation Durbin Watson (DW) tests 11 
                                                 
10 Dickey and Fuller (1981) 
 
11 Durbin and Watson (1971) 
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of unlagged data show that level series are converted from non-stationary to stationary 
processes on first differencing, as are the errors of the associated regressions. The DW tests 
show that the errors in Equations 1 and 2 are not serially correlated. However, 
heteroskedasticity (as shown through White tests12) remains persistent in the errors (except in 
the case of the errors for the Thailand banking system) and weighted least squared 
regressions are specified for the application of Equations 1 and 2. 
On the bases that the series are integrated non stationary processes, the unlagged Equation 3 
model is re-specified into a VAR in order to run VAR based tests of cointegration and 
causality of lagged variables. Cointegration tests (Johansen, 1988) demonstrate whether or 
not a single VAR system representing the interaction of each country’s banking returns, 
political risk variables and world banking returns specified on an optimal lag have similar 
stochastic trends and achieve equilibrium together in the long-term. Causality tests (Granger, 
1988) show the short-term dynamics of the models and provide verification of exogeneity as 
specified in Equation 3. 
Findings 
 
Equation 1 is a basic international banking market 13 model, where banking price index 
returns are deemed a function of a world banking price index returns in unlagged data. The 
model is tested using banking system stock market returns data from three developed banking 
markets in the USA, the UK and Australia and three developing banking markets in Thailand, 
the Philippines and Malaysia. The sizes of the adjusted R square values, the t statistics and 
the coefficients show the strength of the relationship between country-banking price index 
returns and the world banking price index returns.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
12 See White tests for heteroskedasticity with and without cross terms, in EViews4 (2001) 
13 This model is preferred over an ordinary least squares (OLS) model when dealing with the presence of heteroskedasticity of an unknown 
form in the errors of the regressions. 
 13
These regression parameters also show the degree of systematic risk in each country banking 
system. The error of this regression is deemed to represent the unsystematic (idiosyncratic 
risk) in the market model. Lower levels of unsystematic risk (reflected in lower standard 
errors) are expected to be associated with developed banking systems, which are expected to 
have lower political risk.  















USA 0.6332 1.2979 46.0952 0.0282 
UK 0.4717 1.1467 33.1446 0.0346 
Australia 0.0353 0.1749 6.8048 0.0257 
Thailand 0.0266 0.3635 5.8011 0.0627 
The Philippines* 0.0019 0.0660 1.8247 0.0362 
Malaysia 0.0047 0.0884 2.5048 0.0353 
Note: * significant at the 10% level. All other results are significant at the 1% level. 
 
The results demonstrate that, in an overall comparison of the selected country banking 
systems, the developed country system regressions (particularly those for the USA and the 
UK) have higher adjusted R square values, higher regression coefficients, higher t statistics 
and lower standard errors than the developing country systems. It may be concluded that, in 
unlagged data, the developed banking systems have higher levels of systematic risk and lower 
levels of unsystematic risk than the developing country systems when interacting with the 
world banking system in returns. 
These results need to be considered in the light of statistically significant (significance is at 
the 1% level) structural breaks14 in the data in the case of the USA, UK, Australian and 
Malaysian banking systems according to Chow forecast and breakpoint tests. In the cases of 
                                                 
14 A logical structural break occurs at the time of the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre in the USA. These attacks were themselves a 
manifestation of political risk. 
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the Thailand banking system and the Philippines systems the two Chow tests yield conflicting 
results. 
Equation 2 posited that unsystematic risk is represented by the errors of the market model 
specified in Equation 1. Unsystematic risk is deemed a function of the country banking 
political risk variable (that is, political risk for each country associated with that country’s 
daily banking returns). According to White tests, heteroskedasticity of an unknown form 
exists in the errors of the unsystematic risk regressions and weighted least squares regression 
analysis is undertaken in lieu of OLS. The DW tests reveal that there is no serial correlation 
in the errors of the unsystematic risk regressions.  
The errors of Equation 2 represent the portion of unsystematic risk that is unexplained by 
political risk factors. The size of the standard error should be greater for developed banking 
systems because less of their unsystematic risk is expected to be explained by political risk. 
Developed banking systems are expected to be less politically risky and more informationally 
efficient than developing country banking systems. In addition the developed banking 
systems (particularly those of the USA and the UK) are expected to have greater global 
integration and interaction.  
The results in Table 2 show that, in general, the interaction between the unsystematic risk 
variable and the political risk variable is greater in the developing country systems. The 
adjusted R square values and t statistics for the developing country systems are higher than 
those for the developed countries (particularly the USA and UK systems). The standard errors 
in the developed country regressions are generally higher. However, the developing system in 
Thailand has a slightly higher standard error than the UK system. According to DW test 
statistics for each country unsystematic risk regression there is no evidence of serial 











Coefficient t Statistic Standard 
Errors 
 
USA 0.2761 1.9658 21.6718 0.0907 
UK 0.5282 0.5282 37.1100 0.0142 
Australia 0.9552 8.3815 162.0903 0.0517 
Thailand 0.9718 3.4442 205.8439 0.0167 
The Philippines 0.9831 2.7712 267.4335 0.0104 
Malaysia 0.9884 3.2861 324.1919 0.0102 
Note:  Statistical significance levels are at 1%. 
 
The lagged VAR model in Equation 4 is based on the unlagged country banking returns 
model in Equation 3. This bivariate model includes the country political risk variable and the 
world banking returns variable treated exogenously and VAR based cointegration and 
causality tests are applied. These tests provide an indication of the long-run relationships, 
short-term dynamics and exogeneity in each of the developed and developing country 
banking returns models as they each interact with the world banking return and country-
political risk variables.  
Exogeneity would be expected to run from the world banking system to both developed and 
developing banking systems, with stronger relationships between the world system and the 
developed systems because the developed systems are more informationally efficient and 
possess greater global integration. The purpose of the study is to ascertain if exogeneity lies 
with the country-political risk variable in each VAR system either by itself or together with 
the world returns variable within the country banking returns models.  
The VAR stability condition checks in each case showed that no roots lay outside the unit 
circles and that each of the VARs satisfied the stability condition. Lag order selection and 
cointegrating rank determination was undertaken by examination of the maximum value of 
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Schwartz information criteria 15 and by Johansen cointegration tests. After lag order was 
selected, the Johansen test was applied to examine trace statistics and maximum eigenvalues 
at both the 5% and 1% levels of significance. In the cases of each country banking system 
there is evidence of cointegration (that is, three cointegrating equations in each case) on a 1 
day lag order. The VAR pairwise Granger causality/block exogeneity Wald tests were then 
undertaken to ascertain whether or not each endogenous variable could be treated 
exogenously at significance levels of 5% for the sizes of the respective Chi Square values 
(See Appendix 2). 
With regard to the USA banking returns model, the USA political risk variable and the world 
returns variable considered together may be treated as exogenous variables. When considered 
separately, only the USA political risk variable may be treated as an exogenous variable. In 
the latter case dual Granger causality exists, but is stronger (with a higher significant Chi 
Square value) running from the US political risk variable to USA banking returns. In addition 
it is noted that USA returns are exogenous to world returns and that USA political risk in 
returns variable is exogenous to world returns. This demonstrates the unique strength and 
influence of the USA economy and banking system. 
With regard to the UK returns system, the UK political risk variable and the world returns 
variable (considered together and separately) may be treated as exogenous variables. Dual 
causality exists between UK returns and the UK political risk variable, but stronger causality 
runs from the UK political risk variable to UK banking returns. It is also noted that 
significant causality runs from the world returns variable to the UK political risk variable. 
When considered together, the Australian political risk variable and the world returns 
variable may be treated as exogenous to the Australian banking returns variable. When 
                                                 
15 Patterson (2000) suggests that Swartz information criteria may be used in preference to other criteria such as Akaike to simultaneously 
estimate lag order and cointegrating rank. Alternatively an information criterion such as Akaike or Swartz can be used to determine the lag 
order and then the Johansen procedure can be used to estimate the cointegrating rank. This paper uses both the Swartz criterion and the 
Johansen test to estimate lag order and cointegrating rank. 
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treated separately the Australian political risk variable is not statistically significant. Dual 
Granger causality exists between world banking returns system and Australian banking 
returns, but stronger Granger causality runs from the world system to the Australian system. 
It is noted that significant Granger causality runs from the world returns variable to the 
Australian political risk variable. 
Granger causality showed that when considered together the Thailand political risk variable 
and the world return variable may be treated exogenously, but when treated separately, 
Granger causality runs significantly from world banking returns to Thailand returns only.  
The Philippine political risk variable and the world return variable exhibit significant 
exogeneity when considered together and separately, running to the Philippines bank returns 
variable. Significant dual causality exists in the political risk variable and the Philippines 
banking returns system (but the Chi Square value is slightly higher running to the political 
risk variable). There is evidence that the political risk variable and the world returns variable 
considered together may be treated exogenously in the Philippine banking returns system.  
In the case of Malaysian system significant dual Granger causality runs between the 
Malaysian returns variable and the Malaysian political risk and the world returns variables 
whether the latter two variables are considered together or separately. The Chi Square value 
shows that the stronger causality runs from the Malaysian political risk variable and the world 
returns variables to the Malaysian banking returns system, thus providing evidence that the 
former two variables may be treated as exogenous in the Malaysian banking returns system. 
Conclusion 
 
Evidence is provided consistent with theory that developed country systems have higher 
levels of systematic risk and lower levels unsystematic risk than developing countries in the 
sample of countries studied. In the developed banking systems, market risk is expected to be 
greater due to economic factors that are the same for all country banking systems, but have a 
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greater effect in developed banking systems because of greater informational efficiency of 
their banking markets. Unsystematic risk, which includes country specific political, social 
and cultural factors, is greater in developing country banking systems studied. These country 
banking systems exhibit less informational efficiency and more informational asymmetry due 
to higher political risks in areas such as government stability, corruption and quality of 
bureaucracy. The sample of country banking systems was selected to represent strong, 
globally integrated developed economies in the USA and the UK as well as a group of 
developing South East Asian economies in Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines. The 
developing countries have sound trading ties with the USA and have also demonstrated that 
they are susceptible to currency and interest rate shocks (For example, during the South East 
Asian currency crisis of the late 1990s). 
The study also endeavoured to ascertain the proportion of unsystematic risk that may be 
associated with political risks associated with banking returns in the various systems. The 
results generally provide evidence that the political risk variable has a stronger association 
with unsystematic risk in the developing banking systems than in the developed banking 
systems studied. Out of the developed countries the same interactions are greater than in the 
USA and the UK. The Australian banking system is smaller in terms of market capitalisation 
and possesses less global interaction and integration than the banking markets of the USA 
and the UK.  
In each country banking systems the variables are found to be cointegrated. Thus, in each 
country-banking system, over the period of the study, the variables exhibit similar stochastic 
trends and move to stability together in the long-term. Evidence is therefore provided that 
country political risk and world banking system returns are both important variables to 
include together in basic international banking market models.  
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The key issue addressed in this study was one of exogeneity and whether or not a basic 
international banking market model (either single period or lagged) can be expanded by 
controlling for a political risk variable to add new information to the market. Granger 
causality is demonstrated to run, in each country banking system, from the world banking 
system except in the case of the USA banking system. That the USA banking system is 
exogenous to the world system evidences the strength in power and influence of the USA 
political, economic and banking systems, and the degree of financial integration that the USA 
banking system has with the global system.  
For all other banking systems, when the country political risk variable is considered together 
with the world-banking returns variable there is evidence that both may be treated as 
exogenous variables. In the cases of the USA, the UK, the Philippines and Malaysian banking 
systems, their political risks associated with their banking system returns considered 
separately in those systems, may be treated as an exogenous variable. It is evident a new 
market model can be specified in both unlagged and lagged data to help explain returns in 
country banking systems. New information is added to country-banking markets by pure 
political risk factors which are effectively captured in political risk ratings.  
Previous studies have demonstrated that country/sovereign risk ratings from leading ratings 
agencies may be replicated using non-political data and largely reflect economic and financial 
information. The scoring of pure political risk (such as changes of government, corruption, 
the role of the military, the quality of bureaucracy and other factors that are either the cause 
or the effect of social and cultural factors) by reputable political risk rating agencies is 
therefore valuable. This should be of assistance to investors in international banking stocks 
and to banking regulators who need to be aware that pure political risk ratings, when so 
combined with daily returns data, are a leading rather than a lagging indicator no matter what 
the level of informational efficiency in the country banking market.  
 20
Banking stock investors have more information to enable them to make decisions in relation 
to portfolio diversification. Similarly, banking regulators, rather than relying partly on 
country/sovereign risk ratings in their assessments of value at risk will be able to gain new 
information about the riskiness of country banks and banking systems to assist them in 
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Definitions and explanations of pure political risk components (ICRG, 2005) 
 
Government stability ratings are an assessment of a government’s ability to remain in office by carrying out 
declared policy plans. The subcomponents of this factor are government unity, legislative strength and popular 
support. According to the ICRG ratings, socio-economic conditions relate to pressures that conspire to constrain 
government action or to fuel social dissatisfaction. The subcomponents in this category are the level of 
unemployment, the degree of consumer confidence and the level of poverty.  
The investment profile factor affects the risk to investment not covered by other political, economic and 
financial components and is made up of contract viability and expropriation, profit repatriation, and payment 
delays.  
Internal conflict is an assessment of political violence in a country and its impact on governance. The highest 
rating means that there is no armed or civil opposition to the government and the government does not engage in 
arbitrary violence (either direct or indirect) against its own people. Under this rationale the lowest scores would 
apply to those countries where there is ongoing civil war. The subcomponents of this risk factor are thus, civil 
war or coups threat, terrorism or political violence, and civil disorder. 
External conflict measures are an assessment of the risk to the incumbent government from foreign action, 
which includes non-violent external pressure (for example, diplomatic pressure, withholding of aid, trade 
restrictions, territorial disputes, and sanctions) to violent external pressure (such as, cross-border disputes and 
all-out war).  The subcomponents of this category of pure political risk are cross-border conflict, and foreign 
pressures.  
Corruption is an internal assessment of the political system.  Corruption distorts the economic and financial 
environment and reduces the efficiency of government and business in the way the foreign direct investment is 
handled. Corrupt practices enable people to assume positions of power through patronage rather than ability. By 
so doing, an inherent instability is introduced into the political process. Examples of corruption include special 
financial payments and bribes, which ultimately may force the withdrawal of or withholding of a foreign 
investment. However, excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, “favour for favours”, secret party 
funding, and suspiciously close ties between government and business have a lot to do with corruption. A black 
market can be encouraged with these forms of corruption. The potential downside is that popular backlash may 
lead to the rendering of the country ungovernable. 
Military in politics is a problem because the military are not democratically elected. Their involvement in 
politics is thus a diminution of accountability. Other substantial ramifications are that the military becomes 
involved in government because of an actual or created internal or external threat. Government policy is then 
distorted (for example, defence budgets are increased at the expense of other pressing budgetary needs). 
Inappropriate policy changes may be a result of military blackmail. A full-scale military regime poses the 
greatest risk. Business risks may be reduced in the short-term but in the longer-term the risk will rise because 
the system of governance is susceptible to corruption and because armed opposition in the future is likely. In 
some cases, military participation will represent a symptom rather than a cause of higher political risk.  
Religious tensions emanate from the domination of society and or governance by a single religious group that 
seeks to replace civil law and order by religious law. Other religions are excluded from the political and social 
process. The risk involved in such scenarios involves inexperienced people dictating inappropriate policies 
through civil dissent to outright civil war. 
The law and order components are assessments of the strength and impartiality of the legal system and 
popular observance of the law respectively.  
Ethnic tensions relate to racial, nationality or language divisions where opposing groups are intolerant and 
unwilling to compromise. 
The democratic accountability component is a measure of how responsive government is to its people. The 
less responsive it is the greater the chance that the government will fall. This fall will be peaceful in a 
democratic country but possible violent in a non-democratic country. The institutional strength and the quality 
of the bureaucracy is a measure that reflects the revisions of policy when governments change. Low risk in this 
area applies to countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without major changes 
in policy or interruptions in government services. That is, bureaucracies have a degree of autonomy from 









VAR Pairwise Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
 
Sample: 12/31/1999 9/17/2004 
Included observations: 1229 
Dependent variable: USAR 
Exclude Chi-sq D.f Prob. 
PRUSA  15.59349 2  0.0004 
WORLDR  2.145084 2  0.3421 
All  17.50673 4  0.0015 
Dependent variable: PRUSA 
Exclude Chi-sq D.f Prob. 
USAR  12.60971 2  0.0018 
WORLDR  1.766334 2  0.4135 
All  15.67876 4  0.0035 
Dependent variable: WORLDR 
Exclude Chi-sq D.f Prob. 
USAR  7.995331 2  0.0184 
PRUSA  6.594247 2  0.0370 
All  40.13473 4  0.0000 
Dependent variable: UKR 
Exclude Chi-sq D.f Prob. 
PRUK  9.403628 2  0.0091 
WORLDR  57.40651 2  0.0000 
All  65.14455 4  0.0000 
Dependent variable: PRUK 
Exclude Chi-sq D.f Prob. 
UKR  7.899056 2  0.0193 
WORLDR  56.87937 2  0.0000 
All  65.46717 4  0.0000 
Dependent variable: WORLDR 
Exclude Chi-sq D.f Prob. 
UKR  5.560417 2  0.0620 
PRUK  6.530350 2  0.0382 
All  12.23297 4  0.0157 
Dependent variable: AUSTR 
Exclude Chi-sq D.f Prob. 
PRAUST  0.906645 2  0.6355 
WORLDR  87.71548 2  0.0000 
All  90.03391 4  0.0000 
Dependent variable: PRAUST 
Exclude Chi-sq D.f Prob. 
AUSTR  0.984462 2  0.6113 
WORLDR  85.76870 2  0.0000 
All  88.53752 4  0.0000 
Dependent variable: WORLDR 
Exclude Chi-sq D.f Prob. 
AUSTR  3.306344 2  0.1914 
PRAUST  3.567837 2  0.1680 
Dependent variable: THAIR 
Exclude Chi-sq D.f Prob. 
PRTHAI  0.005072 2  0.9975 











Dependent variable: PRTHAI 
Exclude Chi-sq D.f Prob. 
THAIR  0.001737 2  0.9991 
WORLDR  29.55655 2  0.0000 
All  29.63359 4  0.0000 
Dependent variable: WORLDR 
Exclude Chi-sq D.f Prob. 
THAIR  3.138372 2  0.2082 
PRTHAI  2.853639 2  0.2401 
All  8.155069 4  0.0861 
Dependent variable: PHILR 
Exclude Chi-sq D.f Prob. 
PRPHIL  6.494398 2  0.0389 
WORLDR  32.97830 2  0.0000 
All  39.60041 4  0.0000 
Dependent variable: PRPHIL 
Exclude Chi-sq D.f Prob. 
PHILR  7.343642 2  0.0254 
WORLDR  29.50528 2  0.0000 
All  37.36727 4  0.0000 
Dependent variable: WORLDR 
Exclude Chi-sq D.f Prob. 
PHILR  1.071679 2  0.5852 
PRPHIL  1.184726 2  0.5530 
All  2.329420 4  0.6754 
Dependent variable: MALR 
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob. 
PRMAL  6.000462 2  0.0498 
WORLDR  42.73634 2  0.0000 
All  46.79060 4  0.0000 
Dependent variable: PRMAL 
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob. 
MALR  4.977093 2  0.0830 
WORLDR  41.02988 2  0.0000 
All  44.27789 4  0.0000 
Dependent variable: WORLDR 
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob. 
MALR  1.079617 2  0.5829 
PRMAL  1.384139 2  0.5005 
All  11.10527 4  0.0254 
 
Note: USAR, UKR, AUSTR, THAIR, PHILR, MALR and WORLDR  
denote USA, UK, Australia, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and 
 World banking system returns respectively. PRUSA, PRUK, PRAUST,  
PRTHAI, PRPHIL and PRMAL are the political risk ratings associated with  
returns for each country banking system for the USA, UK, Australia,  
Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia respectively. Relevant statistically significant  
results for this paper are typed in bold. 
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